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As the title announces, this is a book about the constitutional origins of the American Revolution as they were reflected in the unfolding debate over the distribution of authority within the British Empire during the late colonial era and the years of imperial crisis from 1764 to 1776. This subject has been of recurrent interest to me for almost sixty years. Through most of the 1950s and early 1960s, I was hard at work trying to sort out the institutional, constitutional, and theoretical dimensions of the development of representative government in four early modern British American colonies between the Glorious Revolution and the American Revolution. Among other things, I was endeavoring to understand the bearing of that development on the controversy that produced the American Revolution. Briefly put, the argument I developed about the Revolution had two main points. The first was that the new British taxation and coercive measures after 1748, some emanating from the Crown and some from Parliament, represented a formidable challenge both to the customary constitutions that the colonies, severally, had been working out for themselves over the previous century or longer and to the thoroughly English rights and principles that those constitutions had been constructed to preserve.
The second was that colonial responses to that challenge, responses that drew heavily on the colonists' own customary constitutions, articulated a conception of the imperial constitution that diverged sharply from the one held at the imperial center, and that this disagreement over the nature of the imperial constitution had an important causal bearing on the American Revolution.
Preface
x When I finally began to publish this work in the late 1950s and early 1960s, 1 few scholars of the origins of the Revolution paid much attention to this particular argument. Concerned principally with showing the many deficiencies of the Progressive interpretation of the Revolution as the product of internal conflict, a view that had enjoyed a brief vogue in the 1930s and 1940s, most students of the Revolution focused on analyzing the ostensible issues that divided metropolitans and colonials between 1763 and 1776 and manifested little concern with exploring the political and constitutional traditions or the patterns of assumptions that underlay and informed that division. When, in the late 1960s, Bernard Bailyn and others did begin to explore those traditions and assumptions in depth, they assigned little causative weight to the specifically constitutional dimensions of the conflict. In Bailyn's ideological interpretation of the Revolution, neither the early modern English jurisprudential tradition of political writing nor the related liberal and Whig traditions that had been largely constructed on that jurisprudential tradition received much emphasis, especially not in comparison with the fears of corruption and ministerial power that, for Bailyn, principally informed colonial protests of the pre-Revolutionary era. 2 The force of my protest that throughout the era before 1763 colonial legislators and polemicists had been infinitely more concerned about limiting prerogative than about preventing corruption was, it seemed to me, mostly lost on a historical community that was rushing to absorb and work out the implications of Bailyn's ideological interpretation. 3 When I returned to the subject in the early 1980s, I discovered that over the previous decade few scholars had 6 The third was the lawyer John Phillip Reid, who had published three monographs and at least a dozen articles on the legal dimensions of the contest between metropolis and colonies between 1763 and 1776. 7 My reaction to these two sets of work, the one by Tucker Preface xii and Hendrickson and the other by Reid, could scarcely have been more different. Whereas I found the former analytically impressive but largely unpersuasive, Reid's work struck me as being of fundamental importance. Never having accepted Bailyn's contention that the American Revolution's sufficient cause was colonial absorption of opposition ideology, 8 I found in Reid's work effective support for my long-standing contention that, to a very important degree, the American Revolution had derived out of a disagreement over the nature of the constitution of the British Empire.
To my surprise, a quick survey of the review sections of the major historical journals revealed little appreciation of the importance of Reid's work. Some journals that should have reviewed any work on the American Revolution had not reviewed his, and those that did review his work seem mostly to have assigned his books to people who, for whatever reasons -whether they were incapable of breaking out of the Bailyn paradigm, resented Reid's sometimes acerbic criticism of historians (which, as historians continued to ignore his work, became increasingly strident), or simply found his legal perspective uncongenial -failed to comprehend the salience of his findings. Both because I thought that Reid had an enormous amount to teach historians about the Revolution and because I myself needed to master his and other legal historians' work in connection with the book I was then writing on the constitutional development of the early modern British Empire, I wrote an article, entitled "From the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution," published in 1986 in the South Atlantic Quarterly, in which I endeavored to translate for historians the works of Reid and other legal scholars, including Barbara Black, Thomas Grey, Hendrik Hartog, and William Nelson, on the origins of the American Revolution. 9 Preface xiii In this highly appreciative translation, I pointed to a whole series of insights that, in my view, both called into question the adequacy of the reigning paradigm and constituted a powerful reinterpretation of the pre-Revolutionary controversy. These insights included (1) the centrality of legal and constitutional concerns in the politics of pre-Revolutionary America; (2) the disputants' law-mindedness and constitution-mindedness and the legal and constitutional nature of the argument; (3) the anachronism during the Revolutionary era of considering law as nothing but the command of the sovereign; (4) the continuing vitality in Britain itself of the jurisprudential conception of English government as limited government and of the English (British) constitution as a constitution in which law confined the discretion or will of monarchs, ministers, judges, and legislators; (5) the consensual nature of law throughout the English-speaking world; (6) the contractual basis of Englishand, of course, colonial -legal and constitutional thought; (7) the fundamental and continuing importance of the doctrine of usage in British legal and constitutional thought; (8) the bicentric character of law within the early modern British Empire, specifically the distinction between what Reid called imperial law and local law; (9) the relative weakness of imperial law in the colonies; (10) the strength of local law and of local control over that law, in that whichever settler groups controlled the colony controlled the law; (11) the indeterminancy of the imperial constitution; and (12) the legitimacy, that is, the quintessential Englishness, of American constitutional arguments in the pre-Revolutionary debates.
Not all of these points were new, but no one, it seemed to me, had explored them as fully or argued them as cogently as Reid and his fellow legal historians had, in the impressive and substantial body of literature that they produced during the decade after 1975, a literature that few historians seemed to read and even fewer to appreciate. For this historian, however, their findings were extraordinarily resonant and useful. They formed a parallel and much more legally informed literature that, explicitly or implicitly, supported, informed, and amplified six points that I wanted to make in www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press
(1) that, in operational terms, that empire was a consensual empire; (2) that authority within it was not concentrated at the center but dispersed among the center and the peripheries; (3) that authority did not flow downward or outward from the center but was negotiated among the center and the peripheries; (4) that effective authority in the peripheries was local; (5) that both the many colonial constitutions and the emerging imperial constitution rested on a customary base (i.e., that custom was the most accurate guide to what these constitutions were); and (6) that the American Revolution principally resulted from a dispute over the nature of the constitution of the British Empire, a dispute in which both sides had a legitimate case. 10 Yet, Peripheries and Center also departed significantly from Reid's and his colleagues' work. Whereas Reid was content to characterize the argument as a debate over two competing views of the British constitution, an older view emphasizing customary restraints on political institutions and a newer Blackstonian view stressing the omnipotence of the Crown in Parliament, I carefully distinguished the metropolitan British constitution from the constitutions of each of the several colonial polities, on the one hand, and from an implicit emerging imperial constitution, on the other. Even though all these "British" constitutions drew on the same legal principles, I argued, neither the colonial constitutions nor the imperial constitution could be conflated with the constitution of the home island, or metropolis, as earlier historians had supposed.
And there were other significant differences between Reid's position and mine. In my view, Reid had made a false contrast between the colonies and Ireland; ignored the extent to which 10 Jack P. Greene Preface xv nonrevolting British colonies in North America, the West Indies, and the Atlantic islands shared the constitutional ideas of the revolting colonies; and completely neglected the specifically colonial roots of colonial legal and constitutional arguments of the 1760s and 1770s. Peter N. Miller, in his book, Defining the Common Good, 11 may be right to suggest that metropolitan thinkers only began to think systematically about the nature and constitutional structure of the empire in the late 1740s and early 1750s, but colonists throughout the empire had been considering such matters almost from the first days of colonization, had produced a rich and extensive body of literature on the subject, and had built a solid and thoroughly internalized political tradition on which writers in the 1760s and 1770s could draw. 12 A consideration of the similarities of the constitutional and legal ideas of the Protestant ascendancy in Ireland, the earlier generations of colonists throughout the empire, and the spokesmen for nonrevolting colonies in the 1760s and 1770s, I argued in Peripheries and Center, considerably strengthened the broad general case I was trying to make.
Moreover, if, in its stress on the colonial emphasis on custom in formulating their constitutional arguments and the legitimacy of those arguments, Peripheries and Center reinforced and paralleled Reid's arguments as they had developed by the mid-1980s, it also moved beyond those arguments to make a number of important interpretive points that significantly challenged existing accounts of the origins of the Revolution. More specifically, the book emphasized Grenville's uncertainty over the constitutionality of the Stamp Act when he initially proposed it; the breadth of colonial opposition to the Stamp Act in 1764 and Preface xvi 1765, which extended not just to taxation but to legislation relating to the internal polities of the colonies; the strength of the conciliatory thrust on both sides of the Atlantic during the quarrel over the Townshend Acts and its immediate aftermath; and the colonial resistance to defining the controversy in terms of metropolitan conceptions of sovereignty as indivisible.
Over the two decades since the publication of Peripheries and Center, few students of the American Revolution have revisited the question of the origins of the Revolution, the principal exceptions being Eliga H. Gould, 13 P. J. Marshall, 14 and Reid. Focusing on the broader European and imperial context over the entire period from 1750 to the end of the Revolution in 1783, both Gould and Marshall acutely place the intraimperial debate of the 1760s and 1770s in a larger international and imperial perspective, but neither of them is principally concerned with constitutional issues. By contrast, Reid has published nine further volumes on these issues: two on the concepts of liberty 15 emphasizes the pervasiveness of a common culture of constitutionalism that made the entire transatlantic English-speaking world into a single discursive community with a common vocabulary, if not always a common definition of crucial concepts within that vocabulary. Similarly, he greatly adds to his cases for (1) the centrality of rights and the rule of law in the pre-Revolutionary controversy; (2) the legitimacy of the colonists' insistence that their rights as Britons dictated that they not be governed by laws without their consent and, moreover, of their demand for restraints on Parliamentary power (as Reid puts it, in the colonists' view Parliamentary supremacy over the Crown did not mean Parliamentary sovereignty over law and the constitution); (3) the continuing authority of custom and precedent in British and colonial constitutional thought; (4) the relative unimportance of natural law theory for the colonial case; and (5) the extraordinary consistency of and lack of novelty in the colonial case throughout the years of controversy. Again and again, Reid's work demonstrates the extraordinary learning in legal and constitutional matters displayed by colonial polemicists and leaders, and their remarkable adroitness as political tacticians, whose pursuit of the strategy of constitutional avoidance enabled them to head off an open rupture for almost a decade. Repeatedly, he demonstrates the anachronism of the view that an authoritative center had unilateral authority to define the imperial constitution. The list of Reid's contributions on this level could be stretched out to enormous length.
Third, in his latest body of work Reid develops two important theses about the origins of the Revolution to which his earlier work paid relatively little attention. Put simply, the first thesis is that the dispute, not over Parliament's authority to tax the colonies, but over its authority to legislate for the colonies, was what "took the constitutional quarrel to the point of armed conflict" and thereby "cast the constitutional die for rebellion." 25 As I pondered the matter more thoroughly, however, I realized that neither Peripheries and Center nor Reid's massive body of work had managed to persuade scholars of the American Revolution to assign more weight to constitutional and legal issues in explaining that event. Both Reid and I had offered constitutional interpretations at a time www.cambridge.org © in this web service Cambridge University Press Cambridge University Press 978-0-521-13230-5 -The Constitutional Origins of the American Revolution Jack P. Greene Frontmatter More information Preface xx when constitutional history was no longer at the forefront of scholarly interest in the American Revolution. Wrapped within a text that spanned the entire era from 1607 to 1788 and within an argument that concentrated on demonstrating the colonial roots of U.S. federalism, the interpretive force of those chapters of Peripheries and Center that offered a constitutional explanation for the Revolution had been lost on a generation more concerned with exploring the character than the causes of the Revolution, whereas Reid's work, notwithstanding its extent and compelling persuasiveness, had been almost entirely neglected by mainstream historians.
Three recent examples can be cited to illustrate this neglect. First, at a John Carter Brown Library seminar in 2007 on a paper on why there had been no significant work done on the origins of the Revolution since the mid-1970s, when I objected that the paper's author had left out any reference to Reid's voluminous writings and by implication to my own Peripheries and Center, the author and two other senior historians of the Revolution present at that seminar responded that they did not take Reid's work as seriously as I did. Indeed, I heard no evidence that they or anybody else at that seminar had even read, much less mastered, it. Second, at the 2008 annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington, a panel of historians, participating in a session the underlying premise of which was that virtually nothing of importance had been done on this subject since 1976 and that the main lines of interpretation now remained essentially where the scholarly discussion had brought them by that date, considered the question of whether the origins of the American Revolution was a subject that, after so many decades of neglect, was worth revisiting. That constitutional questions, including Reid's extensive contribution, got not even a mention at this session powerfully underlines the extent to which mainstream historians have failed even to acknowledge, much less to absorb, this impressive literature. Third, in a forum now being considered by the Journal of American History on the origins of the Revolution, not one of the six contributions
